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CRIMINAL DEFENDERS AND COMMUNITY JUSTICE: THE
DRUG COURT EXAMPLE
William H. Simon*
In many drug courts the lawyers do not even show up for the regular drug court
sessions, and even when they do, it is often difficult to determine just which
persons in the courtroom are the attorneys.
JAMES NOLAN, REINVENTING JUSTICEI
INTRODUCTION
The Community Justice idea and its core institution - the Community Court - is
an ambitious innovation intended to generate new solutions and practices. It thus
inevitably calls for adaptation of the established roles associated with the court
system, and especially the criminal justice system. It asks practitioners to learn
new skills, to accept new conventions, and to participate in the elaboration of a
rapidly evolving experiment.
It is thus not surprising that many lawyers are anxious about the system. It
remains an interesting question, however, whether their anxiety represents some-
thing more than the discomfort that change and challenge typically bring to people
attached to the established ways of doing things. The fact that the new experiments
call for innovation is hardly a strong objection to them. But we might plausibly
regard dramatic change as raising a problem if it had either of two results:
First, change might be a problem if it required lawyers to violate ethical
commitments fundamental to their role. To take an extreme example about another
profession, consider a requirement that doctors carry out corporal punishment (on
the theory that they could best calibrate the measure of pain inflicted). We might
object on the ground that corporal punishment is bad, but even conceding that such
punishment should be inflicted by someone, we might believe that it should not be
inflicted by a doctor. Deliberately inflicting pain is so much in tension with other
values we want doctors to adopt that we might doubt that the practice would be
compatible with a coherent and appealing role morality. Coherent and appealing
role moralities are important because, without them, it may be hard to attract good
people to the job and motivate them to perform it well.
Second, change might be a problem if the skills required of the lawyer in the
new setting had so little in common with skills in other lawyering settings that they
did not seem part of a common intellectual discipline. This is a much less dramatic
concern than the ethical one, but it raises interesting social issues. At some point,
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the discontinuity in skills will suggest that we should not be drawing on the
profession to fill this role. Even before we reach that point, we may develop ideas
about ways in which the role suggests reforms or adaptations of the conventional
forms of training and organization of the profession.
I want to consider these issues in the context of the drug court. This is one of the
most common forms of community courts, and it is the one in which the tension
between traditional and new lawyering roles seems strongest. If community courts
are compared to more traditional criminal processes, the following features stand
out:
First, at least rhetorically and aspirationally, community courts focus on shared
interests and norms. This involves a search for solutions that would be mutually
beneficial to the defendant, the larger community, and perhaps other individuals,
notably victims. From the defendant's point of view, this means the possibility of
both lenience and beneficial services. It also means demands that he profess
concern or commitment for community norms and interests. For court personnel,
the theme connotes collaborative "team" relationships. The judge is more active
and managerial; the prosecutor and defense counsel are less distant from the judge
and each other.
Second, community courts impose a relatively long-term relation of coerced
cooperation with the court. Cooperation means active and flexible compliance
with a series of demands. Cooperation requires a waiver of rights to privacy and
passivity that the defendant would enjoy at trial and afterwards if acquitted (but for
the most part, would not if in prison). The cooperation is coerced because failure to
comply is met with sanctions.
Third, the community court process is experimental. This means that each case
is informed by experience in other cases and contributes to a developing body of
knowledge that informs practice. It means further that practice both in individual
cases and across the range of cases is provisional and subject to revision as
learning occurs.
Community Justice, especially in its drug court version, has some resemblance
to the "therapeutic jurisprudence" that influenced juvenile and family courts and
mental health commitment processes earlier in the century. This is not a flattering
comparison, since these earlier reforms have been subjected to powerful criti-
cism.2 In fact, however, the new model seems different in important respects from
the older one. Community Justice takes account of recent changes in the practice of
several professions. These changes have been influential in other areas of public
policy, notably education, but they have only begun to be noticed in law.
A key difference lies in the conception of therapeutic judgment. To oversim-
plify: The older model gave broad and scantly reviewed discretion to therapeutic
professionals, especially doctors. It conceived of professional judgment as an
2. See generally ANTHONY PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY (2d ed. 1977).
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isolated decision made by a single professional, grounded substantially in the tacit
knowledge of her discipline. In contrast, in the conception that has influenced the
community courts, professional judgment is associated with an interdisciplinary
team process. Ideally, the bases of the judgment are fully explicit. And the
judgment is accretive and provisional - part of an ongoing process of learning and
experimentation. The goal of the process is to facilitate a kind of accountability
that was not possible in the old model. Since each judgment is supposed to be
explicit, and the basis that supports it fully transparent, more rigorous review of
both individual judgments and entire programs should be possible.3
I want to consider the challenge the new approach represents for traditional
conceptions of lawyering. I focus primarily on ethical concerns, which I take up in
three steps. First, I consider the issue on the assumption that the lawyer's job is to
advance, within the bounds of the law, the client's interests, as the client
understands them. I then consider the issues from a perspective that relaxes the "as
the client understands them" qualification - thus conceding that paternalism
inevitably plays an important role in a large range of criminal cases, even in the
ordinary process. Next, I consider the issues from an understanding of the lawyer's
role that insists that, even in more traditional practice contexts, the role plausibly
involves commitments to social or community, as well as client, interests. A final
section considers whether the skills the new system demands of lawyers can
plausibly be seen as grounded in a professional discipline shared with legal
practitioners in other contexts.
I conclude that the demands drug courts place on defense counsel do not
compromise their fundamental ethical conmitments, even given the narrowest
client-focused interpretation of defense counsel's role. I also conclude, albeit with
less confidence, that the skill set required of defense lawyers in drug court does
connect to a coherent intellectual discipline.
I. THE DEFENSE LAWYER AS CHAMPION OF THE CLIENT'S SELF-DEFINED INTERESTS
We should begin by taking at face value, for the moment, the most common
self-description of the defense lawyer's role as advancing, within the bounds of the
law, the defendant's interests, as the defendant herself defines them. This is a
variant of the bar's traditional description of its role as advocating for a client
"zealously within the bounds of the law,",4 and even those who question it concede
that its plausibility is greatest in the criminal defense context.5
It is important to distinguish this "zealous advocacy" view from a much more
3. Here I follow Michael C. Dorf and Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent Experimentalist
Government, 53 VAND. L. REV. 831, 834, 837-39 (2000) (arguing that a model for treatment courts as open and
evolving experimentalist institutions allows for continuous development and innovation).
4. E.g., MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1980).
5. E.g., DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 58-66 (1988).
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specific view of criminal defense that might be called "Warren Court Libertarian-
ism." The latter view expresses a deep suspicion of the state and an anti-
communitarian denial that criminal suspects and defendants have any duty to
cooperate in the criminal justice process.6 Its practical strategies play out in a
series of rights that make prosecution more difficult by refusing information (the
privilege against self-incrimination), insisting on proof beyond a reasonable doubt
of each element of the offense, excluding improperly acquired evidence, and
testing the quality of the prosecution's evidence at trial - irrespective of whether
these practices advance accurate determination of guilt or innocence. Warren
Court Libertarianism led to a view of criminal defense in which a (if not the) key
role of defense counsel was to exploit or exacerbate the limitations on the state's
access to relevant information. (Of course, the Warren Court did not originate
these themes or rights, but its criminal jurisprudence elaborated and focused on
them.)
The major weakness of Warren Court Libertarianism was its relative indiffer-
ence to substantive justice considerations, notably accurate determination of guilt
or innocence and proportionality of punishment. Normatively, this is a weakness
because it offends plausible and widely-held beliefs about the moral priorities of
criminal justice. Strategically, it was a weakness because it made the Warren
Court's constitutional entrenchment of its program politically vulnerable.7 The
Court's decisions limited legislative discretion to directly curtail procedural rights,
but because the Court largely declined to police the substantive fairness of
punishment, legislative discretion over penalties remained vast. Legislatures were
thus able to respond to the popular rejection of the Warren Court's constitutional
vision of procedural justice by extravagantly increasing penalties. From the
defendant's perspective, these reforms undermined the value of procedural rights.
They could still be traded off to mitigate substantively harsh punishments, but
even after th.e u de, punishment remained harsh. And the high penaltipe gave
police and prosecutors so much leverage that whatever deterrent potential the
Warren Court rights had over abusive practices was undermined.
There is no doubt that the Community Justice movement represents an aggres-
sive repudiation of both Warren Court Libertarianism and its draconian counter-
6. For an example of this line of thinking, see Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). The
Court delineated a litany of "fundamental values" involved in the criminal justice system, including:
[O]ur sense of fair play which dictates a fair state-individual balance by requiring the government
to leave the individual alone until good cause is shown for disturbing him and by requiring the
government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load, ... our respect for the
inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each individual to a private enclave where
he may lead a private life, . our distrust of self-deprecatory statements.
Id. (internal quotes omitted).
7. See generally William H. Simon, The Ethics of Criminal Defense, 91 MIcH. L. REV. 1767 (1993); William
Stuntz, The Uneasy Relation Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1 (1997).
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reaction. Community Justice repudiates the Warren Court's categorical suspicion
of (non-judicial) state officials; it also rejects that Court's strong commitment to
privacy and its denial of duties to cooperate with the criminal justice system. And it
shows no respect for the Warren Court's privacy and self-incrimination concerns,
more or less openly aspiring to sweep them away as expeditiously as possible.
No doubt this attitude is troubling to lawyers committed to Warren Court
Libertarianism, but it is important to distinguish Warren Court Libertarianism from
the "zealous advocacy" vision of lawyering. The "zealous advocacy" view
requires the lawyer to do the most she can to help the client advance her interests
within whatever the given legal framework happens to be. Drug courts change the
legal framework, but that does not entail changes in the ethical parameters of the
lawyer's role. Community justice partisans portray their programs as simply
expanding the range of choices for defendants. Some defenders have expressed
doubts about this, but the matter is not really relevant to our question. Whether or
not the defender is better off with the advent of the drug court, the lawyer's role
remains to help him make the choice that best serves his interests among the
options open to him.
Defense counsel emphasize two respects in which the drug court process differs
from the conventional one. 8 First, the defendant's choice whether to enter the drug
court process involves both a longer term and a more uncertain set of contingen-
cies than the choice of whether to go to trial. It's harder to advise the client in such
circumstances. Second, when the defendant chooses the drug court, his lawyer has
a continuing role in the process that does not have any counterpart in the normal
criminal process. The aspect of this post-entrance role that seems to most trouble
practitioners arises from the fact that the defendant has to waive privacy rights
with respect to relevant information. This puts the lawyer in a position where she
will have some responsibility for forcing or encouraging the client to comply with
disclosure duties. 9
To some extent, the problem of uncertainty seems a consequence of the newness
of the program. Experience over time should give the lawyer a more substantial
basis for client advice about the process. In addition, it's not unusual for lawyers to
advise clients in highly uncertain situations. Uncertainty is simply a factor the
client has to weigh in making her decision.
8. For a discussion of the ethical concerns of defense lawyers, see NOLAN, supra note 1, at 77-81; John
Feinblatt & Derek Denckla, Prosecutors, Defenders, and Problem-Solving Courts, 84 JUDICATURE 207 (2001);
Mae C. Quinn, Whose Team Am I On Anyway?: Musings of a Public Defender About Drug Treatment Court
Practice, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 37 (2000).
9. From some ethical perspectives, the fact that the community court model gives the lawyer a long-term
responsibility for the welfare of the client is an advantage over the Warren Court model. In the first liberal critique
of Warren Court Libertarianism, John Griffiths numbered the fact that the lawyer had no responsibility to the
client after she had exhausted defenses to the charges-for example, no responsibilities to protest inhumane
conditions of confinement-among its ethically unattractive features. John Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal
Procedure, or A Third "Model" of the Criminal Process, 79 YALE L.J. 359 (1970).
15992003]
AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW
Moreover, if the aspirations of the drug court succeed, this uncertainty should
progressively diminish. A central goal of the program is to achieve transparency
about its practices and its efficacy. The norms of the experimentalist approach
require an extreme degree of explicitness in defining practices and public reporting
of performance assessment. Thus, over time, one would expect lawyer's to give far
more precise data about drug court process and prospects than about more
conventional alternatives.
Second, the lawyer's role in encouraging the client to comply with his disclo-
sure obligations is consistent with basic professional norms and has many
analogies in the civil sphere. In general, lawyers are not supposed to assist clients
they know to be engaged in fraudulent or unlawful conduct.'o A client who lies or
fails to disclose promised information is engaging in fraudulent or unlawful
conduct. A major dimension of the practice of both civil lawyers in discovery and
corporate lawyers in securities regulation is ongoing monitoring of their clients'
compliance with disclosure obligations. It is true that the most likely professional
duty of a lawyer who discovers noncompliance in these contexts is to withdraw
(perhaps "noisily," with notice to affected parties), rather than report noncompli-
ance to the authorities." Whether a client's waiver on entering a drug court
program should permit a higher disclosure duty to the drug court than a lawyer
would have in these civil contexts is a debatable question. However, there is
probably not a lot at stake here, since even the lawyer's unexplained withdrawal
would signal client dishonesty to the prosecutors and court.
Moreover, the preoccupation with confidentiality misses the new opportunities
drug courts create - opportunities that arise not just from the promise of leniency,
but from new forms of accountability. Accountability is supposed to come from
making judgments explicit and subject to challenge and by systematically generat-
ing and analyzing data on the court's interventions. This suggests a distinctive role
or d ftersc counsel, one grounded in traditional lawyering skil, but quite
different from the practices of information control associated with Warren Court
values.
The new role involves holding the program to its commitments to the client and
forcing it to justify actions adverse to the client in terms of the program's values
and experiences. The lawyer should be able to draw on the program's history and
professed goals to help the client decide what he can plausibly demand from the
program. The lawyer should be in a position to force the program to justify
proposed adverse actions in terms of available knowledge. Advocacy can be
powerful in this context as a way of helping the program professionals articulate
and substantiate their premises. For example, the optimal calibration of sanctions
10. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2002).
11. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 366 (1992) (noting the disclosure
obligations of a lawyer who discovers that her client has violated a court order during litigation).
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for noncompliance is currently a matter of debate. Therapeutic staff tend to call for
tougher sanctions, but research on sanction severity is sparse and inconclusive, and
a study of one court showed a inverse correlation between sanctions and both
graduation and re-arrest rates.1 2 Clearly, there is an important role for defense
lawyers to play in this debate, both case-by-case and in discussions of general
rules.
Defenders wonder how the lawyer can respect the premises of the adversary
system and still be a "team member." The answer depends on how we understand
the adversary system. If we take seriously those conceptions of the adversary
system that see it as a mechanism for combating prejudice and self-validating
preconception through a division of labor designed to ensure that all perspectives
are considered, 13 then the adversary system fits well with experimentalism. On the
other hand, if the adversary system means treating as a "fundamental value" the
ability to conceal, obscure, or distort evidence when it is in the client's interest to
do so, the adversary system has no place in the experimentalist model. The extent
to which this latter conception is embodied in legal authority is debatable, but it
seems fairly clear that whatever rights are entailed by this conception are waivable.
II. THE DEFENSE LAWYER AS A SYMPATHETIC JUDGE OF WHAT THE CLIENT'S
INTERESTS ARE
A savvy repeat-player defendant would often have sufficient experience with the
system to make independent use of her lawyer's advice. But the client of whom
professional responsibility and constitutional norms are most solicitous is the
inexperienced first-timer, with little knowledge of the law or its institutions. The
latter is the kind of client most commonly encountered in drug court. Typically,
those with prior offenses or charges of violent crimes are ineligible.
It is extremely difficult to advise an inexperienced client on a matter involving
great uncertainties that depend on technical matters. Major criminal defense
decisions have many of the characteristics that psychologists have shown impair
coherent judgment - remote future contingencies, large risks, low probability/high
cost outcomes, vividly imaginable outcomes competing with dimly imaginable
ones. In theory, the defendant has to overcome the cognitive constraints associated
with such decisions to process a huge amount of information, some of it quite
technical, in a situation likely to involve emotional stress.
For many such defendants, the best strategy will be to ask the lawyer what to do
and follow her advice. Even a defendant who wants to make her own decision is
12. STEVEN B ELENKO, NAT' L CTR. ADDICTION AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE, RESEARCH ON DRUG COURTS: A CRITICAL
REVIEW 2001 UPDATE 22 (2001) (reporting results of a multivariate analysis of drug court participants that
depicted an association between the imposition of various drug court sanctions and both an increased rate of
rearrest and a decreased probability of eventual program graduation).
13. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-19 (1980).
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likely to be influenced by her lawyer's advice. The lawyer has only limited time to
give advice, and the client has limited capacity to absorb it. No matter how
committed the lawyer is to client autonomy, there is no effective way to give
advice that is not influenced by her own views of the client's interests. To make
intelligible the information the client needs, the lawyer must make decisions about
inclusion and exclusion, sequencing, emphasis, and phrasing that will necessarily
be influenced by her views of the correct decision. When the client articulates a
choice, the lawyer should consider whether it reflects independent judgment. But
there is no set of criteria for making that assessment independent of the criteria for
deciding whether the choice seems to be in the client's interests. 14
Thus, lawyers for unsophisticated clients are paternalists, whether they like it or
not. They have to think and talk about what choices are in their clients' interests,
and they cannot avoid influencing clients to adopt those choices.
Of course, lawyers are right to care about client autonomy and to strive to
present alternatives as fairly as possible. But even when they do this, they cannot
entirely escape responsibility for the choices their clients make. And this suggests
that they need to have thoughtful opinions of their own about what choices are in
the client's interests.
Thus, lawyers cannot plausibly define their duties to protect their clients'
autonomy and rights independently of the goal of making these programs work for
their clients. Lawyers who doubt that these programs adequately respect clients'
rights before the lawyers themselves learn enough to decide whether the programs
are effective in solving the underlying problem are missing the point.
This point about the inevitability of moderate paternalism applies to all
inexperienced clients, even those of normal decision-making capacity. Of course,
people who are addicted to drugs do not have normal decision-making capacity,
though the extent of impairment varies widely. Addiction intensifies the need for
the lawyer to take some responsiuilty for assessing whet" r treatment is in the
client's interests in order to give adequate advice.
The treatment dimension of drug court proceedings involves an additional
dimension of paternalism. In many drug courts, hearings and interactions with
court personnel are staged for therapeutic effects. Public honor and shaming, and
personal approval and disapproval are used to reward and sanction the defendant in
ways that are clearly manipulative. 
15
A defense lawyer might become complicit in these tactics merely by remaining
silent and failing to counteract them; no doubt there are often pressures for her to
actively participate in them. This kind of therapeutic manipulation presents the
lawyer with a series of issues that individually involve small stakes but cumula-
14. See William H. Simon, Lawyer Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs. Jones's Case, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE:
LAWYERS' ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION 165 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2000).
15. See NOLAN, supra note 1, at 62-75.
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tively may amount to a severe affront to the client's dignity and autonomy. It is a
good thing for lawyers to be wary of this kind of therapeutic manipulation, and to
protest it when it becomes abusive. But the basic point about paternalism applies to
this pervasive but small-stakes conduct, as well as to counseling about conscious
high-stakes decisions. It is very hard to distinguish the issue of whether the client's
autonomy is being served from the issue of whether a tactic is in a client's best
interests. Often, it will be plausible to think that the client consents to such
manipulation, and not just in a formal sense. That someone inflicted with a
disability that impairs her capacity for autonomous choice should desire to be
coerced is a paradox to libertarians but also a widely observed fact of life. Whether
the court's program is generally effective will often be the best indication of
whether the client's autonomy is in jeopardy.
III. THE DEFENSE LAWYER AS SERVANT OF THE COMMUNITY
Defense lawyers are often ambivalent about their relation to the larger commu-
nity or society. On the one hand, they see themselves as champions of an individual
in his confrontation with organized society, and they fear duties to society will
corrupt or subvert that role. On the other hand, they don't see themselves as
servants of private interest. They are likely to distinguish their roles from those of
business counsel in terms of their relative commitment to public service. Defend-
ers routinely consider themselves "public interest" lawyers. (At Stanford, we once
had a debate about whether prosecutors were "public interest lawyers" for the
purposes of eligibility for a summer grant program, but I have never heard anyone
question the qualifications of defenders for this designation.)
In theory, the values of client loyalty and public service are reconciled in the
idea that a vigorous defense serves the public value of guarding against official
abuse. This view is least controversial to the extent that defense tends to vindicate
the innocent and force the resolution of doubts about guilt in favor of acquittal. It is
more controversial with respect to those aspects of defense that tend to exclude or
intentionally distort probative information or to require proof of matters that the
defendant could not in good faith dispute. Defense lawyers believe that this type of
defense serves the public by deterring police and prosecutorial abuse. Such beliefs,
however, are largely a matter of faith and dogma, as there has been little effort to
test the effectiveness of aggressive criminal defense in deterring such abuses. And
criminal defenders have not been involved in such efforts; it has not been part of
their conception of their job to test these premises. Thus, the connection between
these practices and the public interest is indirect and speculative.
However, there is another respect in which defenders must take account of
public values more directly. This is in the rationing of their services. Most criminal
defendants cannot pay for their own defenses, and depend on public subsidy. But
notoriously, public subsidy is not adequate to provide an elaborate defense (or in
many cases, a more than perfunctory one) for most defendants. In these circum-
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stances, defenders (especially in salaried-staff programs) find themselves having
to make judgments about how to allocate resources among cases. To some extent,
they can do so simply by considering what possible claims and defenses defen-
dants have and allocating services in terms of the time required to assert them. But
since resources are insufficient to fully develop all claims, priorities have to be set
among clients. Presumably, defenders consult public values when they do this,
favoring those claims and defenses that are more strongly supported by public
values. They tend not to discuss this process publicly, and, to some extent, it seems
to be done tacitly and unreflectively. But all programs must ration. And since
rationing involves favoring some individuals over others, it cannot be done in
terms of individual interests. Public or community values are the only principled
basis for doing so.
Kim Taylor-Thompson, herself an experienced defender, recently argued explic-
itly that there is an important sense in which defenders have duties, not only to a
series of individual clients, but to a broader community. 6 She suggested that
defenders sometimes do, and more often should, reject cases that would require
them to raise defenses that they believe reflect bad policy or law. Where defenses
involve general positions that are sometimes advantageous or sometimes disadvan-
tageous to defendants - such as the admissibility of a category of scientific
evidence that will sometimes be exculpatory and sometimes inculpatory - doctrine
on "positional conflicts" might sometimes preclude the office from inconsistent
positions and hence require the office to choose one side or the other. Such
doctrine, however, does not impose strong constraints. '7 Taylor-Thompson's main
concern is that coordinating defenses across cases can sometimes achieve leverage
against bad practices. For example, if defendants consistently refuse to plead when
prosecutors engage in a questionable practice-pressuring defendants to "snitch"
on others, to take one of her examples-prosecutors may feel pressure to abandon
or modify it. If the defenders are in a community vulnerable to law enforcctueti
abuse, refusing to consider such strategies may deprive the community of one of
their few potential political resources.' 8
However, Taylor-Thompson's article suggests that the judgments that defenders
currently make on behalf of the community are conditioned more than anything
else by their own libertarian values.1 9 She assumes, for example, that the programs
will take a position on the admissibility of a new kind of scientific evidence largely
16. See generally, Kim Taylor-Thompson, Individual Actor v. Institutional Player: Alternating Visions of the
Public Defender, 84 GEo. L.J. 2419, 2442 (1996).
17. See John Dzienkowski, Positional Conflicts of Interest. 71 Tx. L. REv. 457, 540 (1993).
18. Of course, all defendants are entitled to counsel, and counsel has a duty to raise any plausible defenses. So
all these claims will be raised in one way or another. But in jurisdictions with a high-quality public defender
program, public defenders are often more able and have more resources to conduct defenses than the assigned
counsel to whom defendants are remitted when the program does not take the case.
19. See Taylor-Thompson, supra note 16, at 2441-42.
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on the basis of whether the evidence will generate fewer convictions,20 that
defenders will distance themselves from clients who want to seek leniency by
inculpating others, 21 and (to take the example closest to the drug court situation)
that they will discourage or refuse to represent clients accused of serious child
abuse who are offered leniency in return for agreeing to monitored contracep-
tion.2 In principle, she agrees that "community" values ultimately control, but in
the absence of evidence of what those values are, she is quick to assume that the
community thinks like the Warren Court.
Most community court proponents will probably find this an implausible
assessment of public values. Even poor communities are often at least as con-
cerned about effective enforcement against private lawlessness as they are about
abuse of public power. Moreover, the community court presupposes a set of public
institutions subject to community control that might provide more direct and
effective safeguards against official abuse than aggressive criminal defense. Yet
clearly, there is no more reason to take these claims on faith than those of the
defenders. If community courts are worthy of their name, then they should be able
to defend their premises about community values by showing that their own
processes have been open to extensive community participation. And if the claim
is that problems of official abuse are better met by approaches other than criminal
defense, the proponents should have some burden to show that these processes are
in place and are being monitored to show that they are having the desired effect.
IV. THE TRANSFORMATION OF PROFESSIONAL IDENTITY
Lawyers need to acquire new skills to participate effectively in treatment courts.
They need medical and psychological background to understand treatment method-
ology. They need background in social science and statistics to participate in the
evaluation of the court's practices.
The organization of lawyering in these settings is distinctive. Lawyers work as
part of an interdisciplinary team. In litigation, especially criminal litigation,
representatives of adverse parties do not usually consider themselves as part of a
"team." Yet, the idea seems less jarring in transactional work, where parties with
adverse interests typically work, sometimes on a long-term basis, to pursue
overlapping goals collaboratively. In many ways, it makes sense to see drug court
practice as transactional, rather than as a kind of litigation.
It may be more unusual that the team is interdisciplinary in its composition.
20. Id. at 2436-47 (posing a scenario where the police department obtains a new electronic device that purports
to determine an individual's truthfulness).
21. Id. at 2457.
22. Id. at 2450 (posing hypothetical scenario in which defenders office would oppose such a strategy, in lieu of
prison time, because it forces a client to make an impossible choice).
23. Id. at 2434-35 (asserting that when confronted by a conflict of interest between clients, "traditional
defender offices tend to adopt individuated strategies almost reflexively").
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Lawyers often work on their own or with other lawyers formulating advice to be
given directly to the client. Here the lawyer works with professionals from other
fields. Although she does give advice directly to the client, she's also part of a
process designed to make collective decisions. This approach is increasingly
prominent in both industry and government, though lawyers as a group are less
accustomed to it than other professions. It appears to be close to a professional
paradigm in engineering. 4
Michael Dorf and Charles Sabel suggest that the growth of the interdisciplinary
team approach is likely to change the self-conception and organization of the
professions.25 New identities develop around the teams and the problems they
have been organized to work on. So in the drug court area, we have an Association
of Drug Court Professionals - an organization of people with credentials in
different professions but who think of themselves (at least some of the time) not as
drug court lawyers, doctors or social workers, but as "drug court professionals."
If this development continues, there are two paths it might take. First, identities
and associations might bifurcate, with professionals having one foot in an identity
organized around a specific kind of problem and one foot in an identity organized
around one of the traditional disciplines. Or second, the traditional professions
might disintegrate and be pre-empted entirely by the new problem-oriented
identities. For most of the established professions, such as medicine and engineer-
ing, the first scenario seems plausible. These professions are organized around
intricately developed intellectual disciplines, with associated research programs,
that retain a good deal of intricacy and coherence. And the disciplines seem to
underpin skills that play important roles in the problem-solving contexts.
But the situation of law seems more ambiguous. Its disciplinary paradigm is
thinner and less coherent than those of the other established professions. Its
generalist, dilettantish character is one of the appeals of legal education to people
who lack, more fcuseu intcrests or ambiLions. But the igal =-d my's connections
to the world of practice have always been tenuous. If the new developments
attenuate them further, the disintegration scenario might become more plausible.
On the other hand, it seems possible that the profession might evolve in ways that
strengthen its connections to problem-solving communities without losing its
distinctive identity.
Law as an intellectual discipline consists of two types of skills, corresponding to
the coercive and facilitative dimensions of law. The first type is concerned with the
interpretation and analysis of norms governing the coercive activities of the state.
24. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM: A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY 130-39 (2001). One indication of both the trend toward interdisciplinary professional teams and the
difficulty lawyers have in adapting to it is the controversy about the relative responsibilities of lawyers and
accountants for some of the disastrous decisions in the Enron scandal. See Joann Lublin et al., How Real Are the
Reforms?: Corporate-Oversight Bill Will Mean More Change, Confusion, WALL ST. J., July 29, 2002, at B 1.
25. Dorf& Sabel, supra note 3, at 861-65.
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The analysis of statutes and judicial opinions is the core skill; advocacy, litigation,
and counseling on issues of legal permissibility are related. The skills in this
category are related, to varying degrees, to a libertarian, or at least liberal, political
orientation. This orientation suggests that the lawyer's critical role is the protection
of citizens against arbitrary state power. Confidentiality and conflict-of-interests
norms are central to this orientation.
The second, and less developed, type of skills cultivated by lawyers is associ-
ated with transactional practice. Here the emphasis is on construction of frame-
works that simultaneously protect separate individual interests and facilitate
collaboration. The coercive rules that are the focus of the first type of legal work
play an ambiguous background role here, setting both the permissible limits of
private discretion and the default rules in the event of ambiguity or relational
breakdown. At the forefront of transactional work is a kind of relational engineer-
ing that requires both general transactional skills and understanding of the
distinctive activities of the parties. In order to serve their clients and those with
whom their clients collaborate, transactional lawyers produce customized struc-
tures designed to create incentives for mutually beneficial behavior, to constrain
opportunism, and to secure fair distribution of rewards.
Although lawyers have been developing these general transactional skills for a
long time, scholarship and teaching have only recently begun to take account of
them. It is widely believed that, to connect adequately with the world of practice,
the legal academy needs to go considerably further in developing scholarship and
curriculum focused on transactional practice.
Both these strands of established professionalism have the potential to contrib-
ute to community courts. Community courts continue to exercise power; no one
suggests that their benign intentions obviate concerns about abuse of power. It
makes sense to have a player charged with looking out for the distinctive interests
of the defendants. It also makes sense for the occupants of this role to have
associations with organizations outside the community court movement that have
a special commitment to norms of government accountability and individual fair
treatment. To the extent that the contemporary bar has this commitment, its support
for drug court lawyers could be a valuable safeguard against oppression and
self-entrenchment on the part of such courts. But, as I suggested above, it is a
mistake for lawyers to identify this aspect of their role with a limited traditional set
of practices of information control and procedural manipulation. They need to be
open to the promise of these experiments to develop new modes of accountability
and new protections.
Transactional skills could also make a contribution. Community courts create
long-term contractual relations with defendants. Lawyers with experience in these
contexts should be in a good position to advise, negotiate, and re-negotiate
individual deals, and to participate in the refinement of the institution's contractual
practices. Moreover, the community court is itself a complex and evolving legal
form. Its practices combine adjudication with service provision, and it often works
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through subcontracting to private providers. The structuring of these relations calls
for skills of a sort that have been central to transactional practice.
V. CONCLUSION
Defenders should give up appraising - and resisting - community courts from
the perspective of Warren Court Libertarianism. They have much more convincing
and potentially more powerful tools for benefiting their clients in the forms of
accountability to which these institutions profess commitment. These skills will
require some creative elaboration and development in order to fully realize their
potential, but they seem a plausible extension of at least some of the skills
traditionally identified with the legal role.
